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INTRODUCTION 
Brandon Coats was sixteen years old when, as an automobile 
passenger, his spinal cord was crushed in a 1996 car accident leaving over 
80 percent of his body paralyzed. Now a quadriplegic confined to a 
wheelchair, Coats suffers severe muscle spasms and seizures. As Coats 
has explained, “My spinal cord is broken, so messages don’t get back and 
forth from my brain to my body. . . . My legs still work, but they just can’t 
get the signal. Sometimes my whole body can just seize up.”1 At first, 
Brandon used prescription drugs to alleviate the excruciating pain that 
accompanies his muscle seizures. But when those drugs proved ineffective 
over time, Brandon’s doctor’s suggested that he try cannabis,2 more 
commonly known as medical marijuana.3 
In 2000, four years after Brandon’s accident, Colorado voters 
approved Amendment 20 to the Colorado Constitution, decriminalizing 
medical cannabis prescription and use in limited circumstances for 
approved patients with written medical consent “to address a debilitating 
medical condition.”4 But it would be nine years, 2009, before Brandon 
would register for and obtain a state-issued license to use marijuana.5  
 
 1. Daily Dose, Quadriplegic Brandon Coats Fired for Using Medical Marijuana Off Duty, MED. 
MARIJUANA 411 (Apr. 2, 2014), https://medicalmarijuana411.com/brandons-story/ [https://perma. 
cc/R26E-VA4A]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. “The term medical marijuana refers to using the whole, unprocessed marijuana plant or its 
basic extracts to treat symptoms of illness and other conditions.” NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH: NAT’L INST. 
ON DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE 1 (2019) [hereinafter MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE], https:// 
d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/marijuanamedicinedrugfacts_july2019_.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2ANR-6SYP]. The term marijuana has many spellings, marihuana, in particular, being one. 
In this Article, we use the modern spelling of the term unless quoting directly from a primary source; 
in which case, we use whichever spelling is used in that source. Additionally, for purposes of this 
Article, we use the term cannabis to avoid the term marijuana, which has racial overtones. See 
RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, LINDESMITH CTR., THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: 
A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES (1999). 
 4. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14. 
 5. Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 2013 COA 62, ¶ 4, 303 P.3d 147, 149 (Colo. App. 2013), aff’d, 
2015 CO 44, ¶ 5, 350 P.3d 849, 850 (Colo. 2015). 
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In the meantime, Brandon obtained a job in 2007 with a satellite 
television company, Dish Network, as a telephone customer service 
representative, and worked for about two years before he began his 
medical cannabis treatment within the boundaries of state law.6 In 2010, 
Dish Network subjected Brandon to a random drug test at work on which 
he tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), a component of 
medical cannabis.7 Brandon used cannabis within the limits of his medical 
license.8 He never used it at work and was never under the influence of 
cannabis while at work.9 Nevertheless, the following month, Dish 
Network fired Coats for violating the company’s zero-tolerance drug 
policy.10 Brandon sued Dish Network under a state statute that prohibits 
employers from discharging an employee for “engaging in any lawful 
activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours.”11 
Brandon has applied to “as many as 70 jobs” since his employment 
termination from Dish Network, but “[o]nce employers discover why he 
lost his last job, ‘they kind of get a look on their face, like, I’m sorry. 
You’re not going to get the job.’”12 Finding work as a quadriplegic is not 
an easy task—even for someone as motivated as Brandon.13 His $750 
monthly disability benefits are not sufficient to pay his bills but he is 
fortunate that his mother is willing and able to help.14 
Brandon’s story is not unique. Just last year, the Center for Disease 
Control released a study finding that an “estimated 20.4% of U.S. adults 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. (citing complaint allegations). 
 9. Id. at ¶¶ 5–7 (citing complaint allegations). 
 10. Id. at ¶ 7. 
 11.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (West 2007). 
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an employer to terminate 
the employment of any employee due to that employee’s engaging in any lawful activity 
off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours unless such a restriction: (a) 
Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to 
the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a particular 
group of employees, rather than to all employees of the employer; or (b) Is necessary to 
avoid a conflict of interest with any responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of 
such a conflict of interest.”  
Id. 
 12. Amy Martyn, Disabled People Can Be Fired for Using Medical Marijuana, Even in 
Colorado, CONSUMER AFF. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/disabled-
people-can-be-fired-for-using-medical-marijuana-even-in-colorado-042117.html 
[https://perma.cc/A3PA-5H4Q]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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(50.0 million) had chronic pain and 8.0% of U.S. adults (19.6 million) had 
high-impact chronic pain . . . with higher prevalence associated with 
advancing age.”15 
This Article addresses the question of how the law should treat 
medical cannabis in the employment context. Using Colorado as a primary 
example, we argue that states such as Colorado should amend their 
constitutions16 and legislate to provide employment protections for 
employees who are registered medical cannabis cardholders or registered 
caregivers. 
Part I briefly traces the legal regulation of cannabis from an 
unregulated medicine known as cannabis to a highly regulated illicit 
substance known as marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act. Our 
travail through this history reveals, unsurprisingly, an increasing 
demonization of cannabis throughout the twentieth century. That socio-
legal demonization likely hindered the medical development of cannabis 
for at least a century. American society’s negative perception of cannabis 
began to yield, however, as scientific evidence of cannabis’s healing 
capacity gained popularity. Increased demand for medicinal cannabis 
resulted in a clash of perceptions between marijuana, the demonic 
influencer of immoral or criminal behavior, and cannabis, the angelic 
healer. It is this cognitive dissidence that helps explain the strange result 
of Brandon’s case. 
Part II surveys the role of employment law in protecting employees 
who use cannabis for medical purposes. We explore the public policy 
exception to at-will employment and various federal and state disability 
statutes. We conclude that judges can and should apply these measures to 
protect workers who may be vulnerable to discharge because of their 
cannabis use.   
Democracies cannot and should not depend on judges to make 
important changes in public policies, even when those changes are to 
common law doctrines created by judges in the first place. Part III surveys 
two states’ statutes—those of Nevada and Oklahoma—that protect 
workers who use medical cannabis from employment termination. 
Applying the knowledge gained from Part II, we collated what we believed 
to be the best language from the statutes of those two states and rewrote 
 
 15. James Dahlhamer et al., Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-Impact Chronic Pain Among 
Adults—United States, 2016, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1001 (2018), www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm6736a2.htm [https://perma.cc/5KUD-ZRDL]. 
 16. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 14, 16.  
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Colorado’s constitution in a manner that would account for employees’ 
interests and employer’s legitimate concerns.  
Part IV acknowledges that employers may be slow to change their 
medical cannabis policies. With this reality in mind, we review some best 
practices as to how employers can accommodate cannabis use among its 
workers, including appropriate exceptions to an accommodation policy 
that take into account employer’s legitimate business interests without 
cutting into the essential accommodations medical cannabis users need to 
become or remain productive members of the U.S. workforce. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Very Brief History of Cannabis Regulation in the United States 
The term, marijuana,17 refers to “the dried flowers and leaves of the 
cannabis plant”18 that contains psychoactive compounds19 such as 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)20 and non-mind-altering active compounds 
such as cannabidiol (CBD).21 Although cannabis has a long and ancient 
 
 17. For purposes of this Article, we do not discuss the history or many important commercial 
uses of hemp—the part of the cannabis plant (primarily the stem) that is grown for industrial purposes 
such as production of rope, paper, textiles, and biofuels. See generally D. Paul Stanford, Hemp, 
Cannabis and Marijuana: What's the Difference?, COUNTERPUNCH (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www. 
counterpunch.org/2016/03/29/hemp-cannabis-and-marijuana-whats-the-difference/ [https://perma.cc/ 
SA92-9SUD]. Hemp as a cash crop in the territorial United States dates to colonial times. See, e.g., 
Va. Act VIII (legislature terminated 1624) (commanding “every planter as soone as he may, provide 
seede of flaxe and hempe and sowe the same”). Indeed, Native Americans themselves produced hemp 
prior to European colonization. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Virginia Assembly 1619, reprinted in 
LYON GARDINER TYLER, NARRATIVES OF EARLY VIRGINIA, 1609–1625 (1946). While hemp has its 
own rollercoaster ride through legal history, most recently Congress passed the Agriculture 
Improvement Act of 2018, which amends the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 such that industrial 
hemp plants containing no more than 0.3 percent THC are no longer classified as a Schedule I 
controlled substance, thereby paving the way for legal commercial use of hemp. Agriculture 
Improvement Act of 2018, 7 U.S.C § 1639o (2018).  
 18. Marijuana and Public Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 7, 2018) 
[hereinafter CDC], https://www.cdc.gov/marijuana/faqs/what-is-marijuana.html [https://perma.cc/ZY 
F9-Z7Q3].  
 19. Psychoactive or psychotropic drugs are “substances that, when taken in or administered into 
one's system, affect mental processes, e.g. cognition or affect.” See Psychoactive Substances, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/substance_abuse/terminology/psychoactive_substances/en/ [http 
s://perma.cc/MD6E-NDQP]. 
 20. MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 3 (“THC can increase appetite and reduce nausea. 
THC may also decrease pain, inflammation (swelling and redness), and muscle control problems.”). 
 21. CDC, supra note 18. 
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history of use as a medicinal plant,22 it has become the most widely used 
illegal recreational drug in the United States,23 as evidenced by its over 
1,200 nicknames.24 The legal regulation that resulted in cannabis’s 
transformation from medicine to instrument of evil is traced below. 
1. Early Regulation of Cannabis in the United States (1850–1937):  
From Medicinal Drug Listed in the U.S. Pharmacopeia to Restricted 
Drug Under Early Twentieth Century State and Federal Law 
First described in the United States Pharmacopeia25 (USP) in 1850, 
cannabis was widely utilized in the United States as an over-the-counter 
medicine during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.26 Cannabis 
regulation commenced during President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
administration.27 The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, a key piece of 
Roosevelt’s progressive legislation, prohibited trafficking in adulterated 
or misbranded drugs the latter defined as follows: 
 
 22. See, e.g., ERNEST L. ABEL, MARIHUANA: THE FIRST TWELVE THOUSAND YEARS 3, 200 
(1980) (documenting a comprehensive history of medical cannabis tracing its early origins in China, 
use in India and the Middle East, and experimentation in Western medicine by the late 1880s); 
Theodore F. Brunner, Marijuana in Ancient Greece and Rome? The Literary Evidence, 47 BULL. HIST. 
MED. 344 (1973). 
 23. See NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH: NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG FACTS: NATIONWIDE 
TRENDS 1–2 (2015), https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/drugfacts_nationtrends 
_6_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXS7-8KKK].  
 24. Katy Steinmetz, 420 Day: Why There Are so Many Different Names for Weed, TIME (Apr. 
20, 2017), https://time.com/4747501/420-day-weed-marijuana-pot-slang/ [https://perma.cc/G6M3-
X626].  
 25. The United States Pharmacopoeia (USP) is a compendium of drug information first 
published in 1820 by “a group of physicians concerned about the quality and consistency of 
medicines.” Inder Partap Singh & Anita Szajek, What Is a Pharmacopeia?, USP (Aug. 7, 2014), 
https://qualitymatters.usp.org/what-pharmacopeia [https://perma.cc/FR2E-S8QQ]. The first USP 
“contained formulas for the preparation of 217 drugs considered to be the ‘most fully established and 
best understood’ at the time.” Id.; see also F.E. Stewart, The Practice of Pharmacy as a Liberal 
Profession, 27 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 74, 79 (1896) (arguing for “[t]he adoption of the United States 
Pharmacopeia and the National Formulary as a text-book in all medical and pharmaceutic 
colleges . . . to elevate medical and pharmaceutic practice and cause all parties to adhere more closely 
to recognized standards”). In 1975, the U.S.P and National Formulary were combined in one 
publication to form the USP-NF, which today “contain[s] specifications (tests, procedures, and 
acceptance criteria) that helps ensure the strength, quality, and purity of named items.” William C. 
Shiel Jr., Medical Definition of National Formulary, MEDICINENET (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=25605 [https://perma.cc/9VJC-7SKS]. 
 26. Mary Barna Bridgeman et al., Medicinal Cannabis: History, Pharmacology, and 
Implications for the Acute Care Setting, 42 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 180, 181 (2017). 
 27. See generally Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
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Misbranding defined. That the term “misbranded,” . . . shall apply to 
all drugs, or [food product] . . . the package or label of which shall 
bear any statement, design, or device regarding such article, or the 
ingredients or substances contained therein which shall be false or 
misleading . . . . 
That for the purposes of this Act an article shall also be 
deemed to be misbranded: 
In case of drugs: 
First. If it be an imitation of or offered for sale under the 
name of another article. 
Second. If . . . the package fail to bear a statement on the label 
of the quantity or proportion of any alcohol, morphine, opium, 
cocaine, heroin, alpha or beta eucaine, chloroform, cannabis indica, 
chloral hydrate, or acetanilide, or any derivative or preparation of any 
such substances contained therein.28 
Notice that cannabis is lumped in with “alcohol, morphine, opium, 
cocaine, heroin,” among other drugs.29 
The Pure Food and Drug Act, which took over a quarter of a century 
for Congress to pass, had the purpose of ensuring quality standards in the 
food and drug industry, so as to protect the public.30 As one contemporary 
commentator pointed out shortly after the law’s enactment, “the principle 
which shall govern the department in Washington is that every article must 
bear a label which tells the truth, and if manufacturers put upon the market, 
knowingly and wilfully, substances which differ from the standards, that 
difference must be clearly stated . . . .”31 The effect of this law, that same 
commentator explained, was that “the United States Pharmacopceia has 
become of the greatest importance, inasmuch as the law requires that the 
standards for drugs and medicines shall be based upon that authority. The 
 
 28. Id. § 8 (emphasis added). 
 29. Recall that, at that time, the Temperance Movement was well underway and Prohibition was 
a little more than a decade away. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXI. For an excellent history of the Temperance Movement and its relationship to cannabis 
criminalization, see Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree 
of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 
971, 975–90 (1970). 
 30. Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE 
L.J. 351, 376 (1927) (explaining that “the protection of the public was the paramount consideration in 
the enactment of [the Food and Drug Act of 1906]”). 
 31. See L. E. Sayre, Drug Standards with Reference to the Pure Food and Drug Law, 20 
TRANSACTIONS KAN. ACAD. SCI. 48, 51 (1906). 
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United States Pharmacopceia will have, therefore, far greater authority 
than heretofore.”32 
By the time Congress had passed the Pure Food and Drug Act, or 
shortly thereafter, several states had restricted the production, sale, or use 
of cannabis for nonmedical purposes and beyond.33 For example, 
California closely followed the language of federal law in regulating 
cannabis products that were mislabeled.34 Other states restricted the sale 
of cannabis during this time period. For example, Indiana made it 
“unlawful for any person . . . to retail, sell, or give away any 
cocaine, . . . opium, morphine or heroin, cannabis indica, . . . or derivative 
of any of the foregoing substances, or any preparation or compound 
containing any of the foregoing substances” except for “a registered 
pharmacist, . . . and they, only upon the written prescription of a duly 
registered physician, licensed veterinarian, or licensed dentist.”35 Maine 
made it “unlawful for a person to 
sell, furnish, give away, or deliver opium, morphine, heroin, codeine, 
cannabis indica, or cannabis sativa, or any salt, compound, or 
preparation of said substances except upon the written prescription or 
order of a lawfully authorized practitioner of medicine, dentistry, or 
veterinary medicine, which prescription shall be dated and shall bear 
the name of the person giving it and the name of the person prescribed 
for; . . . Prescriptions to be preserved for at least two years and at all 
times open to inspection by designated officials.36 
Some states even criminalized cannabis possession. For example, 
Massachusetts criminalized possession except by certain pharmacists and 
registered healthcare officials.37 In particular, the state permitted law 
enforcement officials to “issue a search warrant” on “probable cause” 
If a person makes complaint under oath to [law enforcement officials] 
authorized to issue warrants in criminal cases, that he has reason to 
believe that opium, morphine, heroin, codeine, cannabis indica, 
cannabis sativa, or any other hypnotic drug . . . is kept or deposited 
by a person . . . in a . . . vessel, or place other than by a manufacturer 
or jobber, wholesale druggist, registered pharmacist, registered 
 
 32. See id. at 48. 
 33. See infra nn.34–38. 
 34. Drugs to be Announced on Label, ch. 358, 1913 Cal. Stat. 767.  
 35. Sale and Use of Cocaine and Narcotics, ch. 118, 1913 Ind. Acts 306. 
 36. Id. 
37. See An Act Relative to Certain Hypnotic Drugs, ch. 283, 1912 Mass. Acts 191. 
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[healthcare official], employees of incorporated hospitals, or a 
common carrier or porter when transporting any drug 
mentioned . . . .38 
Massachusetts decreed further that, upon finding any mentioned 
substance on the premises, the law official shall 
seize and securely keep the same until final action, and to arrest the 
person or persons in whose possession it is found, together with all 
persons. Present . . . and to return the warrant with his doings 
thereon, as soon as may be, to a court or trial justice having 
jurisdiction in the place in which such substance is alleged to be kept 
or deposited.39 
Between passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906 and New 
Deal legislation in the mid-1930s, increasingly more drugs—including 
alcohol—were restricted or banned altogether.40 In 1933, with the 
constitutional ban on alcohol repealed,41 the states and Congress were left 
to focus on other substances in the governments’ twentieth-century 
war on drugs.42 
2. The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937:  
Criminalization of Marijuana Possession, Use, and Trade  
Under the Guise of Taxing to Discourage Use 
Between 1930 and 1937, several changes in the law and public 
perception, laid the groundwork for New Deal legislation regulating 
cannabis. First, in 1930, Harry Anslinger was appointed the first 
 
 38. Id. at §1.  
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat 785 (banning 
heroin and opium use but not marijuana). The Supreme Court found the Harrison Act constitutional 
in United States v. Doremus, on grounds that the Act, which facilitated revenue collection was within 
“the power of Congress acting under its constitutional authority to impose excise taxes.” 249 U.S. 86, 
93–95 (1919). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 42. In 1934, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the 
Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act ostensibly to create uniformity in how the states treated narcotics 
and to fill certain enforcement gaps in the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act. Compare Anslinger, The 
Reason for Uniform State Narcotic Legislation, 21 GEO. L.J. 52, 53 (1932), with Richard J. Bonnie & 
Charles H. Whitebread II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry Into the Legal 
History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 Va. L. Rev. 971, 1010–22 (1970). Without ceremony, 
the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act added cannabis to the list of forbidden drugs. For a succinct but 
excellent review of the Uniform Act, see Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the Red 
Queen’s Race: Medical Marijuana in the New Century, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 673, 683 (2009). 
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Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Although initially 
focused on drugs such as heroin, Anslinger soon became an outspoken 
critic of cannabis. 
In 1937, amid the New Deal era, Congress passed the Marihuana Tax 
Act,43 a statute that ostensibly served to nominally tax cannabis sale, in 
fact criminalized its use and distribution in many if not most 
circumstances. Section 2 of the Act, subsequently codified as Section 4751 
of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), provided for an occupational tax 
whereby “[i]mporters, manufacturers, and compounders of marihuana” 
paid a tax of “$24 per year,” producers and non-registered researchers of 
marijuana and healthcare officials who prescribed medical marijuana paid 
“$1 per year, or fraction thereof,” and non-healthcare professionals who 
“deal[] in, dispense[], or give[] away marihuana” paid “$3 per year.”44 
Adjusted for inflation, these taxes ranged from a high of $440.53 to just 
$18.36—hardly amounts that would greatly affect the marijuana market.45 
Section 2, subsequently codified at IRC Section 4753, further provided 
that at the time of paying the tax the taxpayer must “register his name or 
style and his place or places of business with the collector of the district in 
which such place or places of business are located.”46 
Under Section 7 of the Marihuana Tax Act, marijuana transfers were 
also taxed at “$1 per ounce” for those properly registered under Section 
2;47 however, that tax rose to “$100 per ounce” ($1,836 in 2020 dollars) 
for those who failed to register under Section 2.48 The Act also made it  
unlawful for any person, whether or not required to pay a special tax 
and register under section 2, to transfer marihuana, except in 
pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such marihuana 
is transferred, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the 
Secretary.49  
Regulations issued under the Act required transferees of marijuana 
to apply for an order form with the following information: “(a) the 
 
 43. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. 75–238, 50 Stat. 551. 
 44. Id. at § 2 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4751). In particular, the $3 tax was codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 4751(5) and the occupational taxes were codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4751(1)–(4), (6). 
 45. See Inflation Calculator, DOLLARTIMES, https://www.dollartimes.com/inflation/ [https:// 
perma.cc/9FG4-XVUL]. 
 46. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, § 2, Pub. L. 75–238, 50 Stat. 551 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4753). 
 47. Id. at § 7(a)(1) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4741). 
 48. Id. at § 7(a)(2) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4741). 
 49. Id. at § 6 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4742) (emphasis added). 
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transferee’s name, address, and, If registered, the registration number, (b) 
the name and address of the transferor, and (c) a description, including 
quantities, of the desired articles or materials to be transferred.”50 The 
application must be accompanied by payment of the transfer tax plus 2 
cents for the order form.51 Another regulation required the transferee to 
submit the order form, once received, containing the same information.52 
The Act further mandated that the information contained on the order form 
be available to law enforcement officials.53 
Significantly, the Act criminalized violation of any of its provisions, 
including these regulations enforcing the Act’s provisions. In particular, 
the Act provided for a fine up to $2,000 or imprisonment of not more than 
five years, or both, in the court’s discretion.54 The Act also made it  
unlawful for . . . a transferee required to pay the transfer tax imposed 
by [IRC] section 4741(a)— 
 (1) to acquire or otherwise obtain any marihuana without having 
paid such tax,” or  
 (2) to transport or conceal, or in any manner facilitate the 
transportation or concealment of, any marihuana so acquired or 
obtained.55  
Thus, a person who acquired marijuana and then tried to pay the tax 
was potentially criminally liable. 
Given the harsh criminal punishments and the ease with which these 
regulations could be unintentionally violated, cannabis became too risky 
to prescribe or otherwise market. The demise of legal cannabis use for 
medicinal purposes came when cannabis was removed from the U.S. 
Pharmacopeia in 1942 “because it was believed to be a harmful and 
addictive drug that caused psychoses, mental deterioration, and violent 
behavior.”56 This action effectively removed cannabis’s legitimate 
 
50. Id. 
 51. 26 C.F.R. § 152.66 (1969). 
 52. 26 C.F.R. § 152.69 (1969). 
 53. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, § 11, 50 Stat. 551 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 4773 (repealed 1970)). 
 54. Id. at § 12. 
 55. Id. at § 8(a) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (repealed 1970)). 
 56. INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 16 (Janet E. Joy, 
Stanley J. Watson, Jr. & John A. Benson, Jr. eds., 1999). 
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medicinal status within the medical profession, notwithstanding its ancient 
history as an effective medicinal drug. 
The United States government’s demonization of cannabis as a 
narcotic associated with criminal activities was in full force by the mid-
twentieth century.57 During the 1950s, Congress increased penalties for 
marijuana use, possession, and transport. For example, the Boggs Act of 
195158 made a first-time marijuana possession offense punishable by a 
minimum of two to ten years imprisonment with a fine up to $2,000, and 
a third-time offense punishable up to twenty years.59 The Narcotics 
Control Act of 1956 (NCA) expressly made it unlawful for any 
unregistered person to possess or transport marijuana60 with fines for a 
second or subsequent offense ranging from 10 to 20 years imprisonment 
and fines up to $20,000.61 The NCA further amended existing law to 
allow officials of the Bureau of Narcotics, a division of the 
Treasury Department, to 
make arrests without warrant for violations of any law of the United 
States relating . . . marihuana . . . where the violation is committed in 
the presence of the person making the arrest or where such person 
has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has 
committed or is committing such violation.62 
 
 57. See Jacob Sullum, A Century Later, the New York Times Rejects the Anti-Marijuana 
Propaganda It Peddled, FORBES (Jul. 31, 2014), forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/07/31/a-century-
later-the-new-york-times-rejects-the-anti-marijuana-propaganda-it-peddled/#3680d4a9334b [https:// 
perma.cc/77YU-JJWV] (the New York Times’ peddling of yellow journalism at the outset of the war 
on cannabis picked up on a theme of marijuana-crazed Mexicans by reporting “a widow and her four 
children have been driven insane by eating the Marihuana plant” and that there was “no hope of saving 
the children’s lives” (emphasis added)); see also Tom LoBianco, Report: Nixon Aide Says War On 
Drugs Targeted Blacks, Hippies, CNN (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/ 
politics/john-ehrlichman-richard-nixon-drug-war-blacks-hippie/index.html [https://perma.cc/68GP-
TMJA] (firsthand knowledge of the impetus for passing the CSA to wage a culture war on particular 
segments of society—albeit by declaring war on drugs instead). 
 58. Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767. 
 59. Id. (amending section 2(c) of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, as amended (21 
U.S.C, § 174)). 
 60. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, § 101, Pub. L. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567 (amending 26 I.R.C. §§ 
4744(a), (b), 4755)). 
 61. Id. at § 103 (amending 26 I.R.C. § 7237)) 
 62. Id. at § 104 (codified at 26 I.R.C. § 7606). There were a few other amendments (relating to 
smuggling marijuana, marijuana possession on vessels, and immigration laws) that are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
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The ease with which this so-called tax law created criminal liability 
is infamously illustrated by the facts of Leary v. United States.63 There, 
Berkeley-trained, Harvard psychology professor Timothy Leary was 
stopped at the U.S.–Mexican border attempting to re-enter the United 
States when Mexico refused his entry for failing to have proper 
documentation.64 During the stop, customs officials noticed what appeared 
to be marijuana seeds on the floor of his car.65 A search of Leary’s car 
turned up a small quantity of marijuana found primarily in “a silver snuff 
box [owned by Leary but found on his teenage daughter’s body] 
containing semi-refined marihuana and three partially smoked marihuana 
cigarettes.”66 Leary and his teenage daughter were arrested.67 Leary was 
charged with (1) one count of smuggling marijuana into the United 
States;68 (2) one count of transportation, facilitation thereof, and 
concealment of marijuana after importation in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 176(a);69 and (3) one count of transportation and concealment of 
marijuana as transferees, required to pay the transfer tax in violation of 
Internal Revenue Code § 4744(a)(2).70 Pending medical evaluation,71 the 
court sentenced Leary at the maximum level: “20 years in prison and a 
$20,000 fine for violation of § 176a,” and “10 years in prison and a 
$20,000 fine for violation of § 4744(a)(2).”72 The court ordered that the 
sentences run consecutively and the fines be imposed cumulatively, 
amounting to a total of thirty years and $40,000.73 The 2020 value of 
$40,000 (1967) is $312,430.40. Simply put, the court sentenced Leary to 
thirty years imprisonment and fined him the cost of a family house for 
 
 63. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
 64. Leary, 395 U.S. at 10–11. 
 65. Leary, 395 U.S. at 10. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. Leary’s daughter was charged and convicted of some of the charges. The daughter, 
considered a minor, received a light sentence. See Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 855 (5th Cir. 
1967), rev’d on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
 68. Leary, 395 U.S. at 10. Leary was also charged with smuggling marijuana into the United 
States, but that count was dismissed probably because Leary purchased the substance in New York 
and then crossed the boundary momentarily only to be returned to the United States by Mexican 
officials. 
 69. Leary, 395 U.S. at 29–54. The Court struck down Leary’s conviction on this count on due 
process grounds. 
 70. Leary, 395 U.S. at 11 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a)(2)). 
 71. See Leary, 383 F.2d at 854-55. 
 72. Leary, 395 U.S. at 11 n.5; see Leary, 383 F.2d at 854 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7237(a), providing 
the statutory penalties). 
 73. Leary, 383 F.2d at 855 n.5. 
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possessing three joints in his momentary border crossing out of Mexico 
because he was an unregistered person for the nominal marijuana tax. The 
only way this punishment makes sense is if the American imagination 
perceived cannabis as a powerful agent of criminal behavior and immoral 
conduct. 
Leary successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Marihuana 
Tax Act on grounds that compliance with the Act violated his privilege 
against self-incrimination guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. The 
Court explained that the Marihuana Tax Act’s plain terms 
compelled [Leary] to expose himself to a “real and appreciable” 
risk of self-incrimination . . . . Sections 4741–4742 required him, 
in the course of obtaining an order form, to identify himself not 
only as a transferee of marihuana but as a transferee who had not 
registered and paid the occupational tax under §§ 4751–4753. 
Section 4773 directed that this information be conveyed by the 
Internal Revenue Service to state and local law enforcement 
officials on request. 
[Leary] had ample reason to fear that transmittal to such 
officials of the fact that he was a recent, unregistered transferee of 
marihuana “would surely prove a significant ‘link in a chain’ of 
evidence tending to establish his guilt” under the state marihuana 
laws then in effect. When [Leary] failed to comply with the Act, 
in late 1965, possession of any quantity of marihuana was 
apparently a crime in every one of the 50 States, including New 
York, where [Leary] claimed the transfer occurred, and Texas, 
where he was arrested and convicted.74 
In short, the Court struck down the Act as unconstitutional because 
that law compelled self-incrimination. But the Court could not erase the 
wide-spread belief that cannabis was a powerful agent of criminal conduct. 
3. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970:  
Express Criminalization of Cannabis 
The 1970s and 1980s solidified the reputation of cannabis as an illicit 
drug associated with criminal activity. For example, one study, which 
compared students with free-clinic patients, claimed that “[t]he use of 
other drugs is strongly correlated with the frequency of marijuana use in 
 
 74. Leary, 395 U.S. at 16. 
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the student group, and to a lesser extent in the sample of patients.”75 
Another study ostensibly showed that using hard psychedelic drugs 
increased with cannabis use.76 Robert DuPont, first director of the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse (1973–1978), coined the term “gateway drug”—
a drug used before using an illicit drug—to apply to alcohol and 
cigarettes.77 The term was soon applied to cannabis.78 
One year after the Court found the Marihuana Tax Act to be 
unconstitutional, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) 
to criminalize possession, use, and distribution of “marijuana.”79 The CSA 
defines “the term ‘marihuana’ [to] mean[] all parts of the plant Cannabis 
sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted 
from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, 
derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin.”80 This 
definition resulted in confusion because the Act appeared to regulate only 
one variety of cannabis, namely Cannabis sativa. There are literally 
hundreds of strains of cannabis81 made from domesticating two main 
subspecies—Cannabis sativa and Cannabis indica.82 To further 
 
 75. William McGlothlin et al., Marijuana and the Use of Other Drugs, 228 NATURE 1227, 1228–
29 (1970); see John C. Ball, Marijuana Smoking and the Onset of Heroin Use, 7 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 408, 410–12 (Oct. 1967).  
 76. See Erich Goode, Multiple Drug Use Among Marijuana Smokers, 17 SOC. PROBS. 48, 61–
62 (1969) (a comprehensive study ostensibly showing that use of hard psychedelic drugs increased 
with cannabis use). 
 77. DENISE B. KANDEL, STAGES AND PATHWAYS OF DRUG INVOLVEMENT: EXAMINING THE 
GATEWAY HYPOTHESIS 3–5, 7 (2002). 
 78. Id. DuPont apparently maintains this position to this day. See Robert L. DuPont, Marijuana 
Has Proven to Be a Gateway Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes. 
com/roomfordebate/2016/04/26/is-marijuana-a-gateway-drug/marijuana-has-proven-to-be-a-gateway 
-drug [https://perma.cc/SZN9-KEQN]. But see generally LOREN L. MILLER, MARIJUANA—EFFECTS 
ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1–5, 69, 303–05 (1974) (an early compilation of scientific research pushing 
back on the stepping-stone or “gateway theory”). 
 79. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 
1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904). 
 80. 21 U.S.C. § 802(16). 
 81. Nick Lindsey, How Many Different Strains of Cannabis Are There?, GREEN RUSH DAILY 
(Jan. 4, 2017), https://greenrushdaily.com/cannabis-strains/many-different-cannabis-strains/ [https:// 
perma.cc/235S-YFUA]. 
 82. See generally THE MEDICINAL USES OF CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS (Geoffrey W. Guy, 
Brian A. Whittle & Philip J. Robson eds., 2004). Some scientists include a third subspecies, Cannabis 
ruderalis, which is sometimes classified as Cannabis sativa. The United States Department of 
Agriculture classifies cannabis into two primary groups: cannabis sativa and cannabis sativa indica. 
See Cannabis Sativa L. Ssp. Sativa Marijuana, NAT’L RES. CONSERVATION SERV., https://plants. 
usda.gov/core/profile?symbol=CASAS3 [https://perma.cc/F3JB-BLC5]; Cannabis Sativa L. Ssp. 
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complicate matters, Cannabis sativa L. is the name normally used for 
hemp—a strain of Cannabis sativa that is grown specifically for its 
industrial uses, such as rope production. 
The confusion over terminology resulted in litigation to clarify what 
part of the Cannabis plant the CSA regulated. In United States v. Walton, 
for example, the defendant argued that his conviction of one count of 
unlawful distribution of marijuana under the CSA was invalid because he 
did not distribute the particular species of cannabis named in the law—
Cannabis sativa L.83 The court disagreed, holding that “[t]he legislative 
history is absolutely clear that Congress meant to outlaw all plants 
popularly known as marijuana to the extent those plants possessed 
THC.”84 Relying on the legislative history, the court explained that 
“references to the definition of marijuana in the hearings all either indicate 
that the witnesses believed marijuana was monotypical or that the term 
sativa L. encompassed all marijuana including that known as Cannabis 
indica.”85 Perhaps most significantly, every appellate court that reviewed 
this question has drawn the same conclusion.86 Current research on the 
cannabis plant supports this holding insofar as researchers do not believe 
 
Indica (Lam.) E. Small & Cronquist Marijuana, NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., https://plants. 
usda.gov/core/profile?symbol=CASAI [https://perma.cc/DYD9-D7AG]. 
 83. United States v. Walton, 514 F.2d 201, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 84. Walton, 514 F.2d at 203–04. 
 85. Walton, 514 F.2d at 203 (citing Hearings on H.R. 6906 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 75th 
Cong., 14, 23–24 (1937); Hearings on H.R. 6385 Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 75th 
Cong., 18–42, 55, 60–61, 70–71, 76–78, 90, 122 (1937)). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 616 Fed. App’x 961, 967 (11th Cir. 2015); United States 
v. Lupo, 652 F.2d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wornock, 595 F.2d 1121, 1122 n.1 (7th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Kelly, 527 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gavic, 520 F.2d 
1346, 1352 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Dinapoli, 519 F.2d 104, 106–07 (6th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Spann, 515 F.2d 579, 582 (10th Cir. 1975); Walton, 514 F.2d at 202; United States v. 
Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 574 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Kinsey, 505 F.2d 1354, 1354 (2d Cir. 
1974); United States v. Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845, 849 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Gaines, 489 F.2d 
690, 691 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rothberg, 480 F.2d 534, 536 (2d Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Moore, 446 F.2d 448, 450 (3rd Cir. 1971). But see United States v. One 1966 Chevrolet Sedan, 14 
Crim. L. Rep. 2387 (S.D. Fla. 1974); United States v. Lewallen, 385 F. Supp. 1140, 1142–43 (W.D. 
Wis. 1974). State courts reviewing this issue also tended to broadly construe the definition of 
marijuana for purposes of state law. Cf. People v. Van Alstyne, 121 Cal. Rptr. 363, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1975); People v. Savage, 148 P.2d 654, 654 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Martinez v. People, 417 P.2d 
485, 486 (Colo. 1966); State v. Miles, 545 P.2d 484, 486–87 (Idaho 1976), overruled on other grounds 
by, State v. Bottelson, 625 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Idaho 1981); State v. Luginbill, 574 P.2d 140, 144–45 
(Kan. 1977); State v. Alley, 263 A.2d 66, 70 (Me. 1970); People v. Riddle, 65 Mich. App. 433, 436 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Allison, 466 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Mo. 1971); State v. Economy, 130 P.2d 
264, 269 (Nev. 1942); State v. Romero, 397 P.2d 26 (N.M. 1964); Williams v. State, 524 S.W.2d 705, 
710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). 
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there are major differences between Cannabis sativa and 
Cannabis indica.87 
Marijuana as defined under the CSA is a Schedule I drug. 
Specifically, marijuana shares Schedule I(c) classification with other 
“hallucinogenic substances” such as 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine 
(Ecstacy), Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), Mescaline, and Peyote.88 
That means that it is U.S. policy, as reflected in this congressional 
legislation, that cannabis is (A) a drug which “has a high potential for 
abuse,” (B) a drug which “has no currently accepted medical use in 
treatment in the United States,” and (C) that “[t]here is a lack of accepted 
safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.”89 
Based on these congressional findings, it is “unlawful for any person 
knowingly or intentionally[] . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or 
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, [cannabis].”90 
The CSA thus fully criminalized cannabis, thereby reinforcing 
cannabis as a gateway drug related to criminal activity.91 Court 
 
 87. See Daniele Piomelli & Ethan B. Russo, The Cannabis Sativa Versus Cannabis Indica 
Debate: An Interview with Ethan Russo, MD, 1 CANNABIS & CANNABINOID RES. 44 (2016); Nicole 
Gleichmann, Cannabis Sativa vs. Indica: Is There a Difference?, ANALYTICAL CANNABIS (July 9, 
2019), https://www.analyticalcannabis.com/articles/cannabis-sativa-vs-indica-is-there-a-difference-
311780 [https://perma.cc/BA9D-XQHM]. Rather, the difference between the two has more to do with 
perceived effects of the various strains. Indica strains are believed to have more calming effects, 
“physically sedating, perfect for relaxing with a movie or as a nightcap before bed.” Bailey Rahn, 
Indica v. Sativa: What’s the Difference Between the Cannabis Types?, LEAFLY (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/sativa-indica-and-hybrid-differences-between-cannabis-
types [https://perma.cc/32S6-WHLX]. Sativa strains are thought to have more uplifting effects, 
providing “invigorating, uplifting cerebral effects that pair well with physical activity, social 
gatherings, and creative projects.” Id. There are also hybrids that are marketed by dispensaries that 
have a mix of the two effects. Id. According to Ethan Russo, “[t]he way that the sativa and indica 
labels are utilized in commerce is nonsense . . . . The clinical effects of the cannabis chemovar have 
nothing to do with whether the plant is tall and sparse vs. short and bushy, or whether the leaflets are 
narrow or broad.” Id. (Chemist Jeffery Raber added: “There is no factual or scientific basis to making 
these broad [sativa vs. indica] sweeping recommendations, and it needs to stop today. What we need 
to seek to understand better is which standardized cannabis composition is causing which effects, 
when delivered in which fashions, at which specific dosages, to which types of [consumers].”); see 
Marshall Morgan, Sativa vs. Indica: What’s the Difference, MMJ HEALTH (May 1, 2019), https:// 
mmjhealth.com/sativa-vs-indica-whats-the-difference/ [https://perma.cc/UYW6-LG38]. 
 88. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1), Schedule 1(c) (2018). 
 89. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). 
 90. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)–(a)(1) (2018). 
 91. However, as early as 1972, some law practitioners were advocating for the repeal of federal, 
state, and local laws criminalizing simple possession of cannabis for personal use because the 
individual and social costs substantially outweighed the benefits from prohibition. See Gerald Stern, 
Reforming Marijuana Laws, 58 A.B.A. J. 727, 727–30 (1972). 
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jurisprudence reflects this perception. In Hutto v. Davis, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that Virginia did not commit cruel and unusual punishment 
when a state court sentenced an individual to forty-years imprisonment 
and a fine of $20,000 for possession and distribution of nine ounces of 
cannabis with a street value of approximately $200 in violation of state 
law analogous to the CSA.92 Furthermore, several state courts of last resort 
have found that state legislatures do not act arbitrarily when they regulate 
cannabis as a dangerous drug or because cannabis is a danger to society.93 
This survey, while not comprehensive, should suffice to show that 
cannabis—at least until recently—was perceived as a dangerous drug, the 
mere possession of which merited harsh criminal punishment. Reputations 
die hard. Accordingly, it is not surprising that many politicians and the 
citizens they represent remain reluctant to decriminalize cannabis.94 And 
 
 92. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–76 (1982) (per curiam); see Rener v. Beto, 447 F.2d 20, 
23 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding it was not cruel and unusual punishment for defendant to be sentenced to 
thirty-years in prison for possession of one marijuana cigarette); see also State v. Kelly, 678 P.2d 60, 
71 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (finding that punishment up to “five years imprisonment and fined up to 
$15,000 for growing marijuana” does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). But see State v. 
Grey, 408 So.2d 1239, 1244 (La. 1982) (vacating as too harsh punishment of “eight years at hard labor 
and to pay a fine of $10,000, or, in default thereof, two additional years” for possessing marijuana 
with the intent to distribute in violation of Louisiana law). 
 93. See, e.g., Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 780–82 (1994) (holding that 
marijuana is covered under Montana’s Dangerous Drug Tax Act); In re Jones, 110 Cal. Rptr. 765, 767, 
770–71(Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (The court found that “there is clear and definite evidence [from a 
commission report] that marijuana is a dangerous drug particularly when used by persons with pre-
existing borderline personalities or psychotic disorders, by young people in their formative years and 
perhaps by women of child-bearing potential;” and concluding that given “the dangers that can be 
involved in the use of marijuana, we cannot say that the penalty prescribed [five years to life sentence 
for the sale of marijuana] in this case though harsh and serve [sic], is out of proportion to the offense.”); 
People v. Stark, 400 P.2d 923, 927 (Colo. 1965) (“Clearly, the use of marijuana and other drugs 
identified in the Colorado statute presents a danger to the public safety and welfare of the community 
since they are clearly related to each other and to the commission of crime.”); State v. Renfro, 542 
P.2d 366, 368 (Haw. 1975) (explaining that “[t]he scientific studies of marijuana are still too 
inconclusive to compel the conclusion that the legislature has acted arbitrarily or irrationally in treating 
marijuana as a substantial danger to society”); State v. Simon, 245 So.3d 1149, 1157 (La. Ct. App. 
2018) (characterizing cannabis as a “controlled dangerous substance” under state law); State v. Smith, 
610 P.2d 869, 875 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (concluding that “[w]hile marijuana may not be a 
narcotic . . . or habit forming, if the legislature reasonably has concluded that it is dangerous, it has a 
broad discretion in prescribing penalties for its possession”). 
 94. For example, Attorney General Jefferson Sessions made enforcement of federal laws 
criminalizing cannabis a priority: “Jeff Sessions hates marijuana. Hates it, with a passion that has 
animated almost nothing else in his career. ‘Good people don’t smoke marijuana,’ he has said. He 
even once said about the Ku Klux Klan, ‘I thought those guys were okay until I learned they smoked 
pot.’ He says that was a joke, but even so, it still says something about where he’s coming from.” Paul 
 
974 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:955 
 
   
 
even if decriminalized, the political will to take the next step—
accommodating marijuana use in the workplace—seemed wholly unlikely 
until very recently. The following section briefly surveys the current path 
of cannabis decriminalization and how that path affects employment law. 
B. Cannabis Decriminalization and Legalization:  
Past, Present, and Uncertain Future 
1. The Federalism Clash: Is Cannabis Legal or Illegal? 
The path toward cannabis legalization has taken a gradual, state-by-
state approach, which has included state initiatives to decriminalize 
cannabis,95 provide patient access to medical cannabis,96 and legalize 
recreational markets.97 These developments are very recent. For example, 
voters in the states of Colorado and Washington passed ballot initiatives 
in November 2012,98 “mark[ing] the first time that any jurisdiction 
worldwide ha[d] legally regulated marijuana.”99 As of early 2020, 36 states 
 
Waldman, Opinion, Why Jeff Sessions’s Marijuana Crackdown Is Going to Make Legalization More 
Likely, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2018/0 
1/05/why-jeff-sessions-marijuana-crackdown-is-going-to-make-legalization-more-likely/ [https://pe 
rma.cc/2BZC-AXX3]; see Kris Krane, The 5 Worst U.S. Senators on Marijuana Policy, FORBES (Nov. 
1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kriskrane/2018/11/01/the-5-worst-u-s-senators-on-marijuana-
policy/#67c4e65c78fd) [https://perma.cc/QJ36-D8SG] (“‘I do not have any plans to endorse the 
legalization of marijuana.’ [Senator Majority Leader Mitch McConnell] drew a clear line between his 
feelings towards hemp and cannabis, stating ‘It is a different plant. It has an illicit cousin which I 
choose not to embrace.’”). 
 95. See infra Addendum. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Eleven states and the District of Columbia have passed some legislation permitting the 
recreational use of cannabis. See Alaska Marijuana Legalization, Ballot Measure 2, § 1, ALASKA STAT. 
§ 17.38 (2015); The Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act, Proposition 64, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362 (2017); Use and Regulation of Marijuana, Amendment 64, COLO. 
CONST. art. 18, § 16 (2018); Marijuana Possession Decriminalization Amendment Act of 2014, D.C. 
CODE § 20-153 (2015); Maine Citizen’s Guide to the Referendum Election, Question 1, ME. STAT. tit. 
28-B (2017); Ballot Initiative Question 4, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G (2016); Michigan Regulation 
and Taxation of Marijuana Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.27951 (2018); Initiative to Regulate and 
Tax Marijuana, Question 2, NEV. REV. STAT. § 453D (2016); Control, Regulation, and Taxation of 
Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 475B; Act 86, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4230a 
(West 2018); Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502, WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 69.50 (2012); see also Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., Medical Marijuana and Marijuana 
Legalization, 13 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 397 (2017). 
 98. See Use and Regulation of Marijuana, Amendment 64, COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16 (2012); 
Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502, WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50 (2012); 
see also Rosalie L. Pacula & Rosanna Smart, Medical Marijuana and Marijuana Legalization, 13 
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 397 (2017).  
 99. Pacula & Smart, supra note 98.  
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and Washington, D.C., have legalized cannabis use for medical 
purposes.100 The following map summarizes these developments: 
This map shows that cannabis is still illegal in fourteen states,101 legal 
for medical purposes only in twenty four states,102 and legal for both 
medical and recreational purposes in eleven states and the District of 
Columbia.103 The driving forces behind these policy changes are three-
fold: “the rising state budgetary costs associated with arresting and 
incarcerating nonviolent drug offenders, growing scientific evidence of 
the therapeutic benefits of cannabinoids found in the marijuana plant, and 
strained state budgets that have caused legislatures to look for new source 
of tax revenue.”104 Accordingly, legalizing these markets would 
simultaneously lower the costs of incarcerating nonviolent cannabis 
offenders (because the conduct would no longer be unlawful) and raise 
 
 100. States with Medical Marijuana 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulation 
review.com/states/states-with-medical-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/K47P-WLDA]. 
 101. See infra Addendum. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., TARA HOLMES, W. VA. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY, MODERNIZING WEST 
VIRGINIA’S MARIJUANA LAWS—POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DECRIMINALIZATION, MEDICAL 
MARIJUANA AND LEGALIZATION (2016); Pacula & Smart, supra note 98. 
Figure 1: Legalization of Marijuana in the United States 
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state revenue at a time when state coffers are deplete.105 It would also have 
the added benefit of unlocking and developing cannabis’s ancient 
medicinal uses. 
But while states have commenced a steady flow of legislation 
decriminalizing cannabis and, in some cases, legalizing it for medical or 
recreational purposes, the federal government has continued to regulate 
cannabis as a dangerous Schedule I drug under the CSA. On one side of 
this debate are the thirty-five states that have legalized the medical use of 
cannabis, each having created a specific set of rules for regulating 
cannabis.106 These rules “are customized to each state’s unique policies, 
interests, financial resources, and fiscal plans for excess tax revenue.”107 
On the other side is the federal government. And while some Presidential 
administrations have only loosely enforced laws criminalizing marijuana 
use and possession, the Department of Justice under President Donald 
Trump has taken a strict enforcement approach to these federal crimes.108 
Not surprisingly, this “lack of uniformity between the federal and state law 
results in consumer confusion and inconsistent compliance with the 
current laws governing marijuana use and distribution within the United 
States.”109 
 
 105. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Caulkins et. al., High Tax States: Options for Gleaning Revenue from 
Legal Cannabis, 91 OR. L. REV. 1041 (2013) (discussing excise taxes and explaining how legalization 
could produce other government revenues including, licensing fees, drug tourism, generate sale tax 
revenue from purchasing equipment and necessary supplies); David G. Evans, The Economic Impacts 
of Marijuana Legalization, 7 J. GLOBAL DRUG POL'Y & PRAC. 1 (2013); Michael Vitiello, Legalizing 
Marijuana: California’s Pot of Gold?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1349, 1380 (2009) (discussing the economic 
benefits of reduced prison population); see also Jody Murphy, Opinion, Legalize and Tax Marijuana, 




 106. Silvia Irimescu, Note, Legalizing Marijuana: State and Federal Issues: Marijuana 
Legalization: How Government Stagnation Hinders Legal Evolution and Harms a Nation, 50 GONZ. 
L. REV. 241, 242 (2015). This note is a few years old and therefore cites to fewer states than have 
currently legalized cannabis for medical use. See infra Addendum for up-to-date statistics. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Sam Kamin, Opinion, The Trump Administration's Nonsensical Stance on Marijuana, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-trump-administrations-
nonsensical-stance-on-marijuana/2017/02/27/b5aab714-fd07-11e6-8f41-ea6ed597e4ca_story.html) 
[https://perma.cc/Z8LC-LM25]; Charlie Savage & Jack Healy, Trump Administration Takes Step that 
Could Threaten Marijuana Legalization Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/politics/marijuana-legalization-justice-department-prosecutions.html) 
[https://perma.cc/KEJ5-DNBE]. 
 109. Irimescu, supra note 106, at 242. 
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2. The Importance of Recognizing Cannabis’s Potent Medicinal Purposes 
to Change Perceptions 
While cannabis cultivation could help diversify the economies of 
many cash-strapped states and cannabis decriminalization would remove 
many financial and other burdens from our criminal justice system, it is 
dubious that this industry could gather widespread public support if 
cannabis did not have significant medical efficacy. This is especially true 
in light of its reputation as a gateway drug. For these reasons, one of the 
most significant steps in the history of cannabis legalization relates to 
legislation allowing cannabis for medicinal purposes. 
Medical cannabis110 refers to the use of an unprocessed cannabis 
plant to treat medical conditions and to provide pain relief111 in both 
terminal and nonterminal patients.112 Those who support the use of 
cannabis for medical purposes, such as Brandon Coats’s physicians, 
support the claim that its use is justified to prevent unnecessary suffering 
from “chronic and unbearable pain that persists until death.”113 Physicians 
have typically prescribed medical cannabis to patients when more 
conventional treatments have been ineffective.114 That seventy-two 
percent of U.S. states now recognize the importance of the medicinal use 
of cannabis “illustrates the rising public support for the use of 
medical marijuana.”115 
Scientific studies have repeatedly supported using cannabis for 
medical purposes to treat sundry medical conditions, especially those that 
cause chronic, excruciating, or intractable pain.116 With these and other 
studies in mind, several states have taken legislative steps117 toward 
decriminalizing cultivating, transferring, and ingesting marijuana for 
 
 110. Scientific study of the chemicals in marijuana, called cannabinoids, has led to two FDA-
approved medications that contain cannabinoid chemicals in pill form. See MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE, 
supra note 3. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Kathleen T. McCarthy, Conversations About Medical Marijuana Between Physicians 
and Their Patients, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 334 (2004). 
 113. See id. Cannabis is more often prescribed for cancer patients. Id. 
 114. See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 
(1997); McCarthy, supra note 112, at 334. 
 115. See supra Figure 1, at p. 976; infra Addendum. See generally Elizabeth Rodd, Note, Light, 
Smoke, and Fire: How State Law Can Provide Medical Marijuana Users Protection from Workplace 
Discrimination, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1759, 1794 (2014). 
 116. See generally McCarthy, supra note 112. 
 117. For a review of those state statutes, see infra Addendum. 
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medicinal purposes.118 For example, in 1996, “California became the first 
state to permit legal access to and use of botanical cannabis for medicinal 
purposes under physician supervision with the enactment of the 
Compassionate Use Act.”119 
As discussed above, thirty-six states and Washington, D.C. now 
permit the use of medical cannabis.120 Accordingly, federal prohibitions 
on cultivating, selling, and using cannabis121 are inconsistent with 
historical uses of cannabis for medicinal purposes.122 This inconsistency, 
in turn, creates problems for workers, like Brandon, who rely on medical 
cannabis. 
II. THE ROLE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW IN PROTECTING EMPLOYEES  
WHO USE MEDICAL CANNABIS 
A. Overview 
To understand how this historical survey of cannabis regulation in 
the United States pertains to Brandon’s case, it is necessary to understand 
another legal framework—the law of wrongful discharge. By way of 
background, nearly every state in the United States uses the employment 
at-will doctrine as a default rule.123 This means that either an employer or 
an employee may terminate the employment relationship for any reason—
 
 118. States with medical marijuana laws generally have some form of patient registry, which 
may provide some protection against arrest for possession up to a certain amount of marijuana for 
personal medical use. STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS, NAT'L CONF. ON STATE LEGISLATURES 
(2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/QV 
6A-UYDP]. 
 119. Mary Barna Bridgeman & Daniel T. Abazia, Medicinal Cannabis: History, Pharmacology, 
and Implications for the Acute Care Setting, 42 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 180, 181 (2017) (citing 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996)). 
 120. See supra Figure 1, at p. 976; infra Addendum. 
 121. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018). 
 122. See McCarthy, supra note 112, at 334–36. 
 123. Montana is the only state to have rejected the presumption of at-will employment and 
instead has created a cause of action for wrongful discharge grounded in lack of good-cause 
employment termination. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2020); Blehm v. St. John’s Lutheran 
Hosp., 2010 MT 258, ¶ 18, 246 P.3d 1024, 1027 (Mont. 2010) (applying Montana statute). Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands also require just cause for employment termination. See P.R. LAWS ANN. 
tit. 29, § 185a–m (2009); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76–79 (2019). 
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good or bad—or for no reason at all.124 This is a common law rule.125 
Accordingly, judges in most states have developed exceptions to this rule, 
which allow for wrongful discharge claims. State legislatures and 
Congress can also enact state and federal statutory exceptions to support 
wrongful discharge claims. 
B. The Case of Colorado:  
Colorado Is an At-Will State with Several Exceptions That May Create a 
Cause of Action That Protects Employees like Brandon Coats 
Under Colorado state law, “an employee hired for an indefinite 
period of time is presumed to be an ‘at will’ employee whose position can 
be terminated without cause or notice and whose termination does not give 
rise to a cause of action.”126 As with most states, there are exceptions to 
this default rule. As discussed below, Colorado has both common law and 
statutory exceptions. Moreover, federal law can create a cause of action 
that supersedes the at-will presumption.127 
1. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 
The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized a public policy 
exception to the employment at-will presumption.128 This narrow 
exception provides an employee with a cognizable claim for wrongful 
termination “if the discharge of the employee contravenes a clear mandate 
of public policy.”129 An employee may state a claim for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy by alleging the following: (1) the 
individual was employed by the employer; (2) the employer discharged 
the employee; and (3) the discharge was “in retaliation for exercising a 
 
 124. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518–19 (Tenn. 1884) (observing that 
“[i]f the service is terminable at the option of either party, it is plain no action would lie even to the 
employe[e]; for either party may terminate the service, for any cause, good or bad, or without cause, 
and the other cannot complain in law”), overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Walter, 179 S.W. 
134 (Tenn. 1915). 
 125. See generally Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine 
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000). 
 126. Healion v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 830 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Colo. 1993). The 
Colorado Supreme Court recently rearticulated this statement of state law. See Lucht’s Concrete 
Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, 255 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (stating that “an employer may 
terminate an at-will employee at any time without incurring any legal liability”). 
 127. For example, it is not a defense to a race discrimination claim that the employee was at-
will. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018). 
 128. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 104–05 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). 
 129. Id. at 107 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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job-related right or performing a specific statutory duty” or “would 
undermine a clearly expressed public policy.”130 The public policy itself 
should be a “widely accepted,”131 “clearly mandated,”132 and 
“substantial”133 matter that affects society at large “rather than a purely 
personal or proprietary interest of the [employee] or employer.”134 
Accordingly, the “public policy must concern behavior that truly impacts 
the public in order to justify interference into an employer’s business 
decisions.”135 Sources of a public policy exception, under Colorado law, 
are not limited to the state constitution or its statutes but can include 
regulations and professional codes of conduct.136 
Could Brandon have successfully sued Dish Network for wrongful 
discharge sounding in public policy? To simplify the analysis, let’s assume 
that Brandon, like most workers, was an at-will employee of his employer 
and that his employer, Dish Network, discharged him for using cannabis. 
To determine whether Brandon has a viable cause of action for wrongful 
discharge, we must determine whether his discharge was “in retaliation for 
exercising a job-related right or performing a specific statutory duty, 
or . . . would undermine a clearly expressed public policy.”137 Using 
medical cannabis is not normally a “job-related right.” Nor does it 
constitute performance of a “specific statutory duty.” Accordingly, we 
must determine whether using medical cannabis in these circumstances 
“would undermine a clearly expressed public policy”138 that is a “widely 
accepted,”139 “clearly mandated,”140 and “substantial . . . matter that 
 
 130. Galvan v. First Vehicle Servs., Inc., No. 19-cv-02143-PAB-KMT, 2020 WL 1166857, at 
*3 (D. Colo. Mar. 11, 2020) (citing Kearl v. Portage Env’t, Inc., 205 P.3d 496, 499 (Colo. App. 2008)). 
 131. Crawford Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 552 (Colo. 1997) (en banc). 
 132. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) 
(explaining that “public policy must be clearly mandated such that the acceptable behavior is concrete 
and discernible as opposed to a broad hortatory statement of policy that gives little direction as to the 
bounds of proper behavior”). 
 133. Crawford, 938 P.2d at 552. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Rocky Mountain, 916 P.2d at 525; accord Crawford, 938 P.2d at 552; Kearl v. Portage 
Env’t, Inc., 205 P.3d 496, 499 (Colo. App. 2008); Galvan, 2020 WL 1166857, at *3. 
 136. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain, 916 P.2d at 524–25 (discussing the split in jurisdictions over the 
sources of public policy and expressly holding that codes of professional conduct may constitute one 
such source). 
 137. Galvan, 2020 WL 1166857, at *3 (citing Kearl, 205 P.3d at 499). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Crawford, 938 P.2d at 552. 
 140. Rocky Mountain, 916 P.2d at 525. 
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affects society at large rather than [Brandon’s] purely 
personal . . . interest . . . .”141 
Brandon’s case comes down to whether he can find a public policy. 
Colorado’s constitution is likely a dead-end source for that inquiry. 
Although Colorado’s constitution grants its residents the freedom to use 
cannabis under Amendment XVIII, Section 16(1)(a),142 it expressly does 
not extend protection of that constitutional freedom to employees under 
Amendment XVIII, Section 16(6)(a).143 It is worth deconstructing just 
what these two constitutional provisions mean. Section 16(1)(a) declares 
that Colorado has the following three interests for constitutionally 
promising not to interfere with its residents’ cannabis use: (1) “efficient 
use of law enforcement resources;” (2) “enhancing revenue for public 
purposes;” and (3) “individual freedom.”144 But Section 16(6)(a) explains 
that the freedom to use cannabis is not a freedom from employer regulation 
of employee cannabis use: “Nothing in this section is intended to require 
an employer to permit or accommodate the use, consumption, possession, 
transfer, display, transportation, sale or growing of marijuana in the 
workplace or to affect the ability of employers to have policies restricting 
the use of marijuana by employees.” Simply put, Section 16(6)(a) 
anticipates that the Colorado constitution could be a public-policy source 
for cannabis use among workers and therefore grants employers a 
constitutional right to regulate cannabis use among workers 
notwithstanding those workers’ freedom to use cannabis. 
The inquiry does not end here, however; Brandon can also search for 
a statutory source of public policy. His best bet would likely be Colorado’s 
medical cannabis laws coupled with that state’s most recent law regulating 
medical cannabis, which went into effect on January 1, 2020.145 Under that 
law, Colorado currently offers medical cannabis registry identification 
cards146 to patients with “a disabling medical condition.”147 The statute 
 
 141. Crawford, 938 P.2d at 552. 
 142. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a). 
 143. Id. § 16(6)(a). 
 144. Id. § 16(1)(a). 
 145. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1.5-106 (2019). 
 146. The Colorado statute defines registry identification card to be “the nontransferable 
confidential registry identification card issued by the state health agency to patients and primary 
caregivers pursuant to . . .” the medical marijuana program established under the Colorado 
Constitution, COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1.5-106(2)(e) (2019).  
 147. See id. § 25-1.5-106(2)(a.7) (2019).  
982 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:955 
 
   
 
also grants to patients, who use medical cannabis consistent with state law, 
an affirmative defense to certain state criminal laws: 
[A] patient with a disabling medical condition . . . charged with a 
violation of the state’s criminal laws related to the patient's 
medical use of marijuana will be deemed to have established an 
affirmative defense to such allegation where: 
(I) The patient was previously diagnosed by a physician as 
having a disabling medical condition; 
(II) The patient was advised by his or her physician, in the 
context of a bona fide physician-patient relationship, that the 
patient might benefit from the medical use of marijuana in 
connection with a disabling medical condition; and 
(III) The patient . . . [was] in possession of amounts of 
marijuana only as permitted under this section.148 
The public policy behind this statute—to augment medical cannabis 
access to needy patients—is clearly stated in Section 1, which reads that 
the State “declares that it is necessary to implement rules to ensure that 
patients suffering from legitimate debilitating medical conditions are able 
to safely gain access to medical marijuana . . . .”149 The statute authorizes 
access to the extent consistent with state constitutional, statutory and 
regulatory law.150 
The question for the Brandons of Colorado is whether this section 
creates a clearly mandated, widely accepted, and substantial matter that 
affects society at large—a matter that has sufficient impact on the public 
to justify interference into an employer’s business decisions—rather than 
a purely personal interest.151 In most cases, the answer to that question will 
come down to a balancing of interests—whether the employee’s medical 
needs outweigh the employer’s business interests because the legislative 
policy behind legalizing medical cannabis meets the public policy test. 
First, the policy is clearly mandated. It is expressly stated in Section 1 of 
the statute. Second, Colorado’s long-standing support of medical cannabis 
use coupled with its permissible use of even recreational cannabis suggests 
that the policy is widely accepted. Third, courts are likely to find the matter 
 
 148. Id. § 25-1.5-106(2.5a) (2019).  
149. Id. § 25-1.5-106(1) (2019). 
 150. See id. 
 151. See supra nn.130–136 and accompanying text.  
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to be substantial to the extent that employees couch those interests in the 
human right language of wellness and health management—a message 
that is likely to be heard loud-and-clear in a post-COVID-19-pandemic 
world. To be sure, employers will argue that medical cannabis is a purely 
personal matter because it affects individual employees. But that 
contention misses Colorado’s policy point about augmenting medical 
cannabis access to patients who suffer from debilitating medical 
conditions.152 This is a right that “inures to the benefit of the public at 
large[,]” not just to Brandon.153 The question for courts, then, is whether 
the employer’s concerns in any particular case outweigh this policy. The 
answer to that question will depend on the type of job and the concerns 
that employers raise. Perhaps employers’ safety concerns about flight 
instructors outweigh the public policy no matter how substantial it is. But 
it is hard to imagine how employers’ concerns about telephone customer 
service representatives can outweigh such a substantial interest—unless 
courts are unpersuaded that the policy is a public policy.  
2. Statutory Exceptions to Colorado’s Employment At-Will Doctrine 
A second course of action for the Brandons of Colorado is to use 
either a state or federal employment statute, which expressly creates an at-
will exception. The two most likely candidates are Colorado’s Lawful 
Activities Statute154 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),155 
together with its analogous state civil rights law.156   
a. Lawful Activities Statute 
Brandon himself utilized the Lawful Activities Statute, which makes 
it unlawful “for an employer to terminate the employment of any employee 
due to that employee's engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of 
the employer during nonworking hours.”157 In fact, this statute seems 
tailor-made for Brandon’s situation because Dish Network discharged 
Brandon for using medical cannabis—a lawful activity under Colorado 
law—during nonworking hours.  
 
 152. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1.5-106(1) (2019).  
 153. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. 1988). 
 154. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2019).  
 155. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is the dominant source of disability rights in 
the United States. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009).  
 156. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2019).  
 157. Id. § 24-34-402.5 (2019).  
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The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Brandon’s argument under the 
Lawful Activities Statute. The court held that Brandon’s use of cannabis 
for medical purposes under a Colorado license was not a “lawful activity” 
under the Colorado statute because medical cannabis use is unlawful under 
federal law,158 namely, the Controlled Substances Act.159 The court 
provided the following analysis. First, it reviewed “the commonly 
accepted and understood meaning” of the term “lawful” and concluded 
that the term means ‘“that which is “permitted by law’ or, conversely, ‘that 
which is not contrary to, or forbidden by law.’”160 Next, it reviewed the 
question whether medical cannabis use “that is licensed by the State of 
Colorado but prohibited under federal law is ‘lawful’ for purposes of [the 
Lawful Activities Statute].”161 Brandon argued that it was, and Dish 
argued that it was not. The court agreed with Dish, explaining: 
Nothing in the language of the statute limits the term “lawful” to 
state law. Instead, the term is used in its general, unrestricted 
sense, indicating that a “lawful” activity is that which complies 
with applicable “law,” including state and federal law. We 
therefore decline Coats’s invitation to engraft a state law 
limitation onto the statutory language.162 
Several other state courts have reached results in disagreement with 
the Colorado Supreme Court.163 For example, in Callaghan v. Darlington 
Fabrics Corporation, the Rhode Island Superior Court164 held that the 
CSA did not supersede the state’s medical cannabis law.165 In that case, 
Christine Callaghan alleged that Darlington Fabrics refused to hire her for 
 
 158. Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 2015 CO 44, ¶ 11, 20, 350 P.3d 849, 851, 853 (Colo. 2015). 
 159.  21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018); see supra nn.79–80 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Coats, 2015 CO at ¶ 17 (quoting Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 2013 COA 62, ¶ 13, 
303 P.3d 147, 150 (Colo. App. 2013)).  
 161. See id. ¶ 18 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2019)).  
 162. See id. 
 163. See generally Zachary D. Bombatch, Cases Addressing Employee Protections Under 
Marijuana Laws Remain Inconsistent, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.natlawrevi 
ew.com/article/cases-addressing-employee-protections-under-marijuana-laws-remain-inconsistent 
[https://perma.cc/Y3WX-V8V8]. 
 164. The Superior Court of Rhode Island is the court with “original jurisdiction in all felony 
proceedings, in civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, and in equity matters” 
and with “concurrent jurisdiction with the District Court in civil matters in which the amount in 
controversy is between $5,000 and $10,000.” See Superior Court: A Message From Presiding Justice 
Alice B. Gibney, R.I. JUDICIARY, https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/NR6C-8LVA]. 
 165. Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corp., No. PC-2014-5680, 2017 WL 2321181 (R.I. Super. 
Ct. May 23, 2017). 
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an internship because she held a medical marijuana card in violation of 
both the Hawkins–Slater Act166 or the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act 
(RICRA).167 The court explained that “the CSA is concerned with stopping 
the illegal trafficking and use of controlled substances. To read the CSA 
as preempting either the Hawkins–Slater Act or RICRA would imply that 
anyone who employs someone that violates federal law is thereby 
frustrating the purpose of that law.”168  
In Smith v. Jensen Fabricating Engineering, Inc., a Connecticut state 
trial court adopted Rhode Island’s view.169 There, the employer refused to 
hire employee Smith when the employer learned that Smith was using 
cannabis to treat the symptoms associated with Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD), consistent with Connecticut's Palliative Use of 
Marijuana Act (PUMA).170 The court concluded that the CSA did not 
preempt PUMA, relying on language in the CSA itself, which expressly 
does not preempt state law “unless there is a positive conflict between that 
provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot 
consistently stand together.”171 The court explained:  
In and of itself, [PUMA] does not authorize the use of marijuana. 
[PUMA] simply says that an employer may not fire or refuse to 
hire an employee solely because that individual uses marijuana in 
compliance with PUMA's requirements and in a manner that has 
no effect on that employee's workplace performance or the 
employer's ability to obtain business. The CSA says nothing about 
these issues.172 
Similarly, in Chance v. Heinz Kraft Foods Company, in the context of 
a wrongful termination and employment discrimination case where the 
employee, a medical cannabis user, tested positive for cannabis, the 
Delaware Superior Court held that the CSA did not preempt the anti-
discrimination provision of the Delaware Medical Marijuana Act 
 
 166. “No . . . employer . . . may refuse to . . . employ, . . . or otherwise penalize, a person solely 
for his or her status as a cardholder.” R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 21-28.6-1 to 28.6-12 (2019) (commonly 
known as the “The Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act”). 
 167. Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-112-1 to 112-2 (1990). 
 168. Callaghan, 2017 WL 2321181, at *14. 
 169. Smith v. Jensen Fabricating Eng’r, Inc., No. HHDCV186086419, 2019 WL 1569048, at *4 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2019). 
 170. Id. at *1 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408a–v). 
 171. Id. at *3 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2018)). 
 172. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p(b)(3)). 
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(DMMA).173 In that case, the court observed that “the DMMA explicitly 
prohibits employers from disciplining employees who use marijuana for 
medical reasons, and who fail drug tests because of it.”174 The court further 
noted that at least eight other states—Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Maine, Nevada, New York, Minnesota, and Rhode Island—have similar 
statutory provisions.175   
b. Disability Statutes 
The other option for the Brandons of Colorado is to allege a cause of 
action based on the ADA or the Colorado civil rights statutory equivalent. 
Both the ADA176 and the Colorado civil rights statute177 prohibit 
employers from taking an adverse employment action against an employee 
because of that employee’s disability. To make out a case for employment 
discrimination under the ADA, Brandon must show that, “at the time he 
was fired, (1) he was a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) he was 
qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the 
essential functions of his job; and (3) he was fired because of his 
disability.”178 
Brandon could readily show that he is a disabled person under the 
ADA, which defines the “term ‘disability’ [to] mean[], with respect to an 
individual . . . a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities of such individual.”179 To satisfy this 
 
 173. Chance v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co., No. K18C-01-056 NEP, 2018 WL 6655670, at *3 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2018). 
 174. Id. at *3, n.18 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4905A(a)(3) (2011)). 
 175. Id. (citing Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 273 F. Supp. 3d 326, 331 (D. Conn. 
2017)). 
 176. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018). The ADA prohibits employers from 
“discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, 
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2018).  
 177. The Colorado civil rights statute makes it an “unfair employment practice . . . [f]or an 
employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, to harass during the course of 
employment, or to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment against any person otherwise qualified because of disability.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
34-402 (2019).  
 178. Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011).  
 179. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2018). The Colorado civil rights statute defines disability as 
defined under the ADA. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(2.5) (2019). Accordingly, a separate 
analysis of the Colorado statute is omitted here. While the Colorado civil rights statute adopts the 
ADA definition of disability, neither the Supremacy Clause, nor other federal law requires a state 
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definition of disability under the ADA, an employee “must (1) have a 
recognized impairment, (2) identify one or more appropriate major life 
activities, and (3) show the impairment substantially limits one or more of 
those activities.”180 The ADA defines major life activities broadly as 
“includ[ing], but . . . not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, 
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, 
communicating, and working.”181 
The question whether an employee, who needs to use medical 
cannabis, is a disabled person depends on the reason why that person needs 
to use medical cannabis. Take Brandon, for instance. He uses medical 
cannabis for excruciating pain caused by involuntary muscle spasms 
resulting from his paralysis. Taken together, Brandon’s paralysis plus his 
crippling pain impairs several major life activities, such as walking, 
standing, lifting, bending, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 
working. 
Brandon could also show that he was qualified for the job because he 
held it for several years before he was fired not for incompetence, but for 
using medical cannabis. The question then is whether Brandon could show 
that he was fired because of his disability. This is a tricky question. 
Brandon wasn’t fired so much because of his disability as he was fired 
because of the accommodation that made him a more productive worker. 
Accordingly, Brandon’s real complaint is that Dish discharged him 
because it would not accommodate his disability. 
Brandon’s case for reasonable accommodation is similar to Barbuto 
v. Advantage Sales and Marketing, where (in the context of a wrongful 
termination and employment discrimination case) the employee, who used 
cannabis for Crohn’s disease, tested positive for that substance.182 Relying 
on the Massachusetts civil rights statute, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts found that where the employee can show that he or she is a 
“handicapped person” as defined under state law,183 permitting the off-site 
 
court’s interpretation of federal law to yield to the federal court’s interpretation, unless the 
interpretation is delivered by the United States Supreme Court. Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 
672 (Colo. 1998). 
 180. Carter, 662 F.3d at 1142 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Tesone v. 
Empire Mktg. Strategies, 942 F.3d 979, 997 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2018).  
182. Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., L.L.C., 78 N.E.3d 37, 46 (Mass. 2017). 
 183. An Act for the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana, ch. 369, §1, 2012 Mass. Acts 
1583.  
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use of marijuana during non-working hours may constitute a reasonable 
accommodation.184 The court further explained that the employer owed 
such employee a statutory obligation185 “to participate in the interactive 
process to explore with her whether there was an alternative.”186 The 
employer also bears the burden of justifying why the accommodation (in 
this case using medical cannabis off-site and off-duty), if denied, presents 
an undue burden on the employer.187 
C. Summary 
The exceptions to at-will employment considered in Part II(B) are 
commonly available in most states. They serve as a basis for judicial 
protection of employees who use medical cannabis responsibly within the 
confines of state law. This serves several legislative and other public 
policies including the one stated under the ADA: “to assure equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals”188 with disabilities. Accordingly, we urge 
state judges to consider these exceptions in reviewing cases where an 
employer terminates the employment relationship because an otherwise 
productive employee was using medical cannabis lawfully under state law. 
 
 184. Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 46. 
 185. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(16) (2018).  
 186. See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 47.  
 187. See id. at 45. The same analysis would occur under federal law:  
As part of her prima facie case, the employee must show: (1) that she is a disabled person 
within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she was otherwise qualified for her current 
position; (3) that she was terminated from that position because of her disability; (4) that 
she requested reasonable accommodation either within her current position or through 
transfer to a vacant position for which she was qualified; and (5) that, despite her request 
for reasonable accommodation by transfer to a vacant position, the employer continued to 
seek applicants for the vacant position or hired persons who possessed the disabled 
employee's qualifications. Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the 
employer to prove either undue hardship or that it made an offer of reasonable 
accommodation. At all times, the employee bears the ultimate burden of persuading the 
trier of fact that she has been the victim of illegal discrimination.  
Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1998). For an in-depth discussion of how these doctrines 
work in the context of drug addiction, see generally Samuel Brown Petsonk & Anne Marie Lofaso, 
Working for Recovery: How the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Human Rights Laws Can 
Facilitate Successful Rehabilitation for Alcoholics and Drug Addicts, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 891 (2018). 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2018). 
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III. PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY LANGUAGE 
IN COLO. CONST. ART. XVIII, SECTION 14 AND  
COLO. CONST. ART. XVIII, SECTION 16 
A. Overview 
In Part II(B), we explored several causes of actions under 
employment law that could protect employees like Brandon Coats, and we 
urged state judges to permit those causes of action. However, it is always 
safer to rely on strong constitutional or statutory language to protect 
society’s most vulnerable. Below we have surveyed two state statutes to 
show how state legislatures, if so inclined, could further protect workers, 
like Brandon. 
B. Survey of State Statutes  
The following subsections review two states—Nevada and 
Oklahoma—that have expressly created statutory protections for 
employee use of medical cannabis.  
1. Nevada’s Statute Regarding Medical Cannabis in Employment 
Nevada does not “[r]equire any employer to allow the medical use of 
marijuana in the workplace.”189 However, 
the employer must attempt to make reasonable accommodations for 
the medical needs of an employee who engages in the medical use of 
marijuana if the employee holds a valid registry identification card, 
provided that such reasonable accommodation would not: (a) Pose a 
threat of harm or danger to persons or property or impose an undue 
hardship on the employer; or (b) Prohibit the employee from fulfilling 
any and all of his or her job responsibilities.190 
Nevada’s inclusion of reasonable accommodations is an important 
step in protecting employees who hold valid registry identification cards 
for medical cannabis use. This allows employees, like Brandon Coats, 
whose medical cannabis use is essential to his job performance and 
enjoyment of life activities, to have an “equal opportunity not only to get 
 
 189. NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.800(2) (2019). 
 190. NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.800(3)(a)–(b) (2019). 
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a job,” but also to keep that job, and to “successfully perform [the] job 
tasks.”191 
Although Nevada has expressly included reasonable accommodation 
protection language in its statute, the text remains unclear as to whether 
employees or job applicants who use medical cannabis off-duty and test 
positive for marijuana on pre- or post-employment testing are protected.192 
For this text, we review Oklahoma’s medical cannabis statute. 
2. Oklahoma’s Statute Regarding Medical Cannabis in Employment 
The Oklahoma Medical Marijuana and Patient Protection Act, which 
went into effect on August 30, 2019,193 prohibits an employer from 
refusing to “hire, discipline, [or] discharge . . . [an] employee” solely 
based on that “employee’s status as a medical marijuana licensee.”194 The 
Act also prohibits an employer from refusing to “hire, discipline, [or] 
discharge . . . [an] employee” solely based on “a positive test for 
marijuana . . .” unless (1) the employee does not have a “valid medical 
marijuana license,” (2) the employee “possesses, consumes or is under the 
influence of medical marijuana” while on the job, or (3) the employee 
works in a “safety-sensitive” position.195 The Act defines “safety-
sensitive” as “any job that includes tasks or duties that the employer 
reasonably believes could affect the safety and health of the employee 
performing the task or others” and includes a non-exhaustive list of 
examples.196 
 
191. Office of Disability Emp’t Policy, Accommodations, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.go 
v/odep/topics/accommodations.htm [https://perma.cc/H77L-H8QV]. 
 192. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.800(3) (2019). 
 193. Fred Morgan, What You Need to Know About the Unity Bill, STATE CHAMBER OKLA.: IN 
THE NEWS (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.okstatechamber.com/blog/post/what-you-need-to-know-
about-the-unity-bill [https://perma.cc/Z9JP-5579]. 
194. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 427.8(H)(1) (Supp. 2019). 
 195. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 427.8(H)(2)(a)–(c) (Supp. 2019). 
196. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 427.8(K)(1) (Supp. 2019). “Safety-sensitive” jobs include 
but are not limited to 
any of the following: (a) the handling, packaging, processing, storage, disposal or 
transport of hazardous materials; (b) the operation of a motor vehicle, other vehicle, 
equipment, machinery or power tools; (c) repairing, maintaining or monitoring the 
performance or operation of any equipment, machinery or manufacturing process, the 
malfunction or disruption of which could result in injury or property damage; (d) 
performing firefighting duties; (e) the operation, maintenance or oversight of critical 
services and infrastructure including, but not limited to, electric, gas, and water 
utilities, power generation or distribution; (f) the extraction, compression, processing, 
manufacturing, handling, packaging, storage, disposal, treatment or transport of 
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This Act accomplishes two important goals.197 “One, it respects the 
will of the voters following the legalization of marijuana in Oklahoma.198 
Two, it provides much-needed clarity for employers and business owners” 
on the law’s role in protecting their legitimate managerial and business 
concerns.199 
C. Proposed Language 
We provide the following protective language so that citizens may 
use it as a ballot initiative to encourage or compel legislators to amend 
their state constitutions and adopt protective provisions for employees 
who are registered medical cannabis patients or who are designated 
caregivers of registered patients. The focus here is on changing the 
language in the Colorado Constitution, but the language serves as an 
example for future use in other states as well. Incorporating this language 
will protect employers from litigation, protect employees from 
discrimination, balance the competing interests of employers and 
employees, prevent individuals with debilitating conditions from having 
to choose between a life of pain (but no job) and gainful employment (but 
excruciating pain), and increase employment options for both employers 
and employees. The following language is grounded in the text of the 
Nevada200 and Oklahoma201 statutes. 
The proposed amendments would require employers to provide 
reasonable accommodations for registered medical cannabis patients and 
disallow discrimination based solely on an employee’s status as a 




potentially volatile, flammable, combustible materials, elements, chemicals or any 
other highly regulated component; (g) dispensing pharmaceuticals; (h) carrying a 
firearm, or (i) direct patient care or direct child care.  
Id.  
 197. Morgan, supra note 193. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.800 (2017). 
 201. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 427.8 (Supp. 2019). 
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1. Amendment to Article XVIII, Section 14 of  
Colorado’s State Constitution 
AMENDMENT NO. ____. Amend Colo. Const. Art. XVII, Section 14 by 
replacing 10(b) with the following: 
(10)(b) No employer may refuse to hire, discipline, discharge or 
otherwise penalize an applicant or employee based solely on past or 
present status as a registered medical marijuana patient or designated 
caregiver of a medical marijuana patient unless: (1) it would cause 
the employer to lose licensing-related benefits or funding under 
federal law, (2) the employer has good faith belief that the employee 
possesses, consumes, or is under the influence of medical marijuana 
on company property or during work hours, (3) the employer has a 
good faith belief that the employee was impaired or using marijuana 
while working on company property during work hours, but the 
employee must be given a chance to challenge the basis for the 
determination, or the position is one involving safety-sensitive job 
duties, as such term is defined in 10(c) of this section. 
(c) As used in this section: “Safety-sensitive” means any job that 
includes tasks or duties that the employer reasonably believes that 
could affect the safety and health of the employee performing the task 
or others including, but not limited to, any of the following: 
(1) the handling, packaging, processing, storage, disposal or 
transport of hazardous materials; 
(2) the operation of a motor vehicle, other vehicle, 
equipment, machinery or power tools; 
(3) repairing, maintaining, or monitoring the performance or 
operation of any equipment, machinery or manufacturing 
process, the malfunction or disruption of which could result 
in injury or property damage; 
(4) performing firefighting duties; 
(5) the operation, maintenance or oversight of critical 
services and infrastructure including, but not limited to, 
electric, gas, and water utilities, power generation or 
distribution; 
(6) the extraction, compression, processing, manufacturing, 
handling, packaging, storage, disposal, treatment or 
transport of potentially volatile, flammable, combustible 
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materials, elements, chemicals or any other highly regulated 
component; 
(7) dispensing pharmaceuticals; 
(8) carrying a firearm; or 
(9) direct patient care or direct childcare. 
(d) Employers must try to make reasonable accommodations for 
registered medical marijuana patients’ off-site, off-duty use of 
marijuana as long as it would not pose a safety threat to people or 
property, cause an undue hardship, or prevent the employee from 
fulfilling his or her job responsibilities. 
2. Amendment to Article XVIII, Section 14 of  
Colorado’s State Constitution  
AMENDMENT NO. ____. Amend Colo. Const. Art. XVIII, Section 16 
by replacing 6(a) with the following: 
(6)(a) Nothing in this section is intended to require an employer to 
permit or accommodate the recreational use, consumption, 
possession, transfer, display, transportation, sale or growing of 
marijuana in the workplace or to affect the ability of employers to 
have policies restricting the use of recreational marijuana by 
employees. 
D. Reasons Why the Proposed Amendments Should Be Adopted 
Without the implementation of the above constitutional (or statutory) 
amendments, what happened to Brandon Coats would continue to happen 
to every registered medical cannabis patient whose ability to perform 
essential life activities depends on medical cannabis use. Brandon Coats, 
a registered medical cannabis patient, was fired from his job for violating 
the company’s zero-tolerance drug policy when he tested positive for THC 
after a random drug test.202 Brandon is now unemployed and cannot find 
work.203 He must now choose between using medical cannabis to manage 
his debilitating symptoms or living with the painful symptoms that 
 
202. Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 2013 COA 62, ¶ 4, 303 P.3d 147, 149 (Colo. App. 2013), 
(citing complaint allegations), aff’d, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 5, 350 P.3d 849, 850 (Colo. 2015). 
203. Id.  
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accompany his condition as a quadriplegic just for a chance at 
employment.204 
For another take on the position of employees who rely on the use of 
medical cannabis to sustain essential life activities, such as maintaining a 
job, imagine the following: It is 2020 and you currently live in Colorado 
and work as an accountant at a small accounting firm. You have just been 
diagnosed with cancer at the young age of 30. You start chemotherapy and 
your hair begins to fall out, you become fatigued, start to vomit until there 
is nothing left in your stomach, suffer nerve and muscle problems, start to 
lose your sense of taste and appetite, and fall into a state of depression.205 
Your physician recommends that you try medical cannabis to manage your 
symptoms.206 Medical cannabis helps you immensely, enough so that you 
can return to work. A few weeks after you return to work, your boss fires 
you after a drug test comes back positive for THC. You lose your job, your 
income, and your health insurance. You can no longer afford medical 
cannabis to manage your symptoms. You can no longer afford 
chemotherapy to stay alive. You desperately search for employment, but 
employers refuse to hire you because of your medical cannabis usage. You 
now must choose between using medical cannabis to manage your 
symptoms or trying to live with the awful symptoms that accompany 
cancer to gain employment. This example, along with Brandon Coats’s 
story, illustrate precisely why Colorado, and other states, should 
implement the proposed statutory language by amending their 
constitutions. 
To date, the Colorado Court of Appeals has dismissed employees’ 
claims for employment discrimination and wrongful termination where the 
employee was terminated for medical cannabis use.207 As a result, medical 
cannabis patients in Colorado are left with the following impossible 
Hobson’s choice: (1) give up cannabis and continue to suffer but lawfully 
pursue a career and the possibility of living independently (assuming the 
 
204. Id.  
205. Diana Brinkley, Emotional Distress During Cancer Chemotherapy, 286 BRIT. MED. J. 
663, 663–64 (1983).  
 206. Medical marijuana can provide relief of cancer-related symptoms like pain, nausea, and 
inflammation. David Bienenstock, A Patient’s Guide to Using Cannabis for Cancer, LEAFLY (Feb. 6, 
2019), https://www.leafly.com/news/health/how-to-use-medical-marijuana-for-cancer [https://perma 
.cc/MJR2-4BBQ]. “Some research has even shown that some cannabis compounds may slow cancer 
growth and shrink tumors. Cannabis can also elevate your mood at critical moments, and even help 
you psychologically come to grips with the difficult times ahead.” Id. 
 207. See, e.g., Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 2013 COA 62, 303 P.3d 147 (Colo. App. 2013).  
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pain does not prevent the employee from being productive at work) or (2) 
continue to use cannabis but give up the right to pursue a career and thus 
become dependent on family members or the government for survival. In 
this way, the current state of Colorado law208 places employers’ 
concerns—legitimate or illegitimate—above employees’ interests. 
The statutory amendments proposed would balance employee and 
employer interests. The amendments would provide a private right of 
action for registered medical cannabis patients, like Brandon Coats, and 
would also allow patients to “bring successful wrongful termination 
claims” based on a “clear, statutory public policy.”209 The proposed 
amendment would still protect an employer’s interest through the 
inclusion of exceptions.210 Article XVII 10(b)(1) provides an exception 
that would ensure that the employer’s funds under federal law would not 
be at risk.211 Article XVII 10(b)(2) and 10(b)(3) ensure that an employer’s 
job productivity would not fall to a loss.212 It further ensures an employer’s 
ability to protect itself from third-party liability in the case of a job-related 
incident related to the use of medical cannabis.213  
In addition to balancing these interests, the amendment would greatly 
help Colorado’s economy. Colorado has been a leader in the crusade to 
decriminalize and legalize cannabis.214 Colorado was the seventh state to 
legalize medical cannabis,215 and the first state to legalize recreational use 
of marijuana and to regulate the production and distribution of marijuana 
for adults.216 Accordingly, Colorado already raises enormous revenue 
from marijuana sales, runs a market serving as a model for other states, 
and as of August, 2019, had 81,035 patients with active medical cannabis 
 
         208. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16. 
 209. Elizabeth Rodd, Light, Smoke, and Fire: How State Law Can Provide Medical Marijuana 
Users Protection From Workplace Discrimination, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1759, 1793 (2014).  
         210. Id.  
         211. Id.  
         212. Id.  
         213. Id.  
         214. See Andrew A. Monte et. al., The Implications of Marijuana Legalization in Colorado, 
313 [J]AMA 241 (2015).   
         215. Sam Kamin, Colorado Marijuana Regulation Five Years Later: Have We Learned 
Anything At All?, 96 DENVER L. REV. 221, 224 (2019); see Pacula & Smart, supra note 98. 
         216. See COLO. DEP’T. PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, MEDICAL MARIJUANA REGISTRY PROGRAM 
UPDATE (AS OF JANUARY 31, 2009) (on file with Seattle University Law Review). 
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registrations.217 Colorado has even recently passed a bill allowing the 
delivery of marijuana products to customers.218 
In summary, it is highly unlikely that the voters and legislators of 
Colorado wish to make registered medical cannabis patients choose 
unemployment (and lost health insurance and dependence) over continued 
use of a state-sanctioned substance for managing debilitating medical 
conditions. Colorado authorizes the use of medical cannabis; it should, 
therefore, provide protections for those who use it. The purpose of these 
medical cannabis statutes—to promote the “health, safety, and welfare of 
citizens”219—is frustrated without the proposed amending language.220 It 
also frustrates the cost-savings and revenue producing goals of legalizing 
cannabis because those who lose their jobs for using medical cannabis may 
become a public burden. As one commentator explained, “It is high time 
that states protect disabled employees from suffering employment 
discrimination due to their use of a state-sanctioned, therapeutic 
remedy.”221 
IV. ACCOMMODATIONS FOR EMPLOYEES LAWFULLY USING  
MEDICAL CANNABIS 
A. Overview 
Employers may struggle with implementing the proposed language 
requiring them to reasonably accommodate registered medical cannabis 
patients. Change is often difficult. This Part provides helpful ideas for 
reasonable accommodations in the workforce that benefit both employers 
and employees.  
Employers providing work accommodations for registered medical 
cannabis patients can choose between a vast array of options such as 
 
         217. Robert M. Kline, Courts Are Siding with Employees Who Use Medical Marijuana, NAT’L 
L. REV. (June 19, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/courts-are-siding-employees-who-
use-medical-marijuana [https://perma.cc/5AVL-E428]; Matej Mikulic, Colorado Current Active 
Medical Marijuana Patients 2017–2019 By Month, STATISTA (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/586495/medical-marijuana-patients-colorado-current-by-month/ 
[https://perma.cc/XY25-KTDJ]. 
         218. H.B. 19-1234, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019).  
         219. Rodd, supra note 209, at 1766.  
 220. See id. at 1793–94.  
 221. Id. at 1794. 
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modifying employees’ job duties,222 adjusting work schedules to 
accommodate medical needs,223 transferring the employee to a non-safety-
sensitive position, modifying work rule policies (e.g., shifting from “zero-
tolerance drug testing” to “zero-tolerance drug-free workplace”), and 
allowing the employee to use “marijuana products that have low 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).”224 
B. Exceptions Included in Proposed Amendment to  
Colo. Const. Art. XVIII, Section 14 
Employers may refuse to hire or take adverse action against 
employees in circumstances where the position is safety-sensitive, the 
employee is using marijuana on-site during working hours, or a registered 
employee’s off-site medical marijuana use would cause the employer to 
lose licensing-related benefits or funding under federal law. Employers 
should, however, narrowly construe these exceptions.225 
1. Why the Safety-Sensitive Position Exception is Needed 
An individual in a safety-sensitive position, if impaired by marijuana 
in the workplace, could endanger the health and well-being of themselves 
colleagues and the general public. The proposed amendment recognizes 
that danger and specifically carves out an exception for safety-sensitive 
positions.  
Suppose that Brandon Coats obtains a position as a mining site 
supervisor. His job duties include monitoring the performance or operation 
of any equipment, machinery, or manufacturing process, the malfunction 
or disruption of which could result in injury or property damage. 
Brandon’s new position requires him to be exceptionally alert in his 
response and judgments. Brandon still uses medical cannabis and remains 
a registered medical cannabis patient. The use of such causes Brandon to 
 
 222. Allen Smith, Some Employers Accommodate Medical Marijuana Users, SHRM (Apr. 18, 
2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/accom 
modating-medical-marijuana-users.aspx [https://perma.cc/RY6X-V8PM]. 
223. Office of Disability Emp’t Policy, supra note 191.  
 224. Alonzo Martinez, Marijuana Accommodations In The Workplace: Your Employees Are 
Smoking Pot—Now What?, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alonzomarti 
nez/2019/10/01/marijuana-accommodations-in-the-workplace-your-employees-are-smoking-pot-
now-what/#a1c7ade507d1 [https://perma.cc/TPC8-XJCB]. 
 225. Courtney Bru, Employers May Soon Rely on ‘Safety-Sensitive’ Exceptions to Medical 
Marijuana Use, JDSUPRA (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/employers-may-soon-
rely-on-safety-63790/ [https://perma.cc/G844-MS3U]. 
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suffer some impaired judgment, distorted perceptions, and memory 
impairment,226 all traits inconsistent with Brandon’s new job duties.  
This illustration exemplifies the concern surrounding marijuana use 
in safety-sensitive positions and the grave need for the proposed 
exception.227 To utilize this safety-sensitive position exception, the 
employer should confirm, and continuously ensure, that the job duties of 
a particular position fall under the safety-sensitive position examples.228 
The employer should then modify its policies to include the safety-
sensitive position exception, making sure to incorporate the language from 
the proposed amendment.229 Prior to modification of policies, the 
employer should provide proper notice230 to employees who are subject to 
the policy changes.231 The employer should regularly check for any 
modifications that would change a safety-sensitive position to a non-
safety-sensitive position and make sure that their policies are up-to-date 
with current law before taking any adverse actions against employees.  
2. Why the Employee Use of Medical Cannabis During Work Hours  
Exception is Needed 
Imagine a scenario where Brandon Coats, a telephone customer 
service representative for Dish Network, comes to work with cannabis. 
While at work, Brandon begins to smoke the cannabis. His co-worker, at 
the desk beside him, inhales the cannabis that Brandon is smoking. This 
co-worker just happens to have an unknown cannabis allergy. The co-
worker grows wheezy as she chokes on the smoke, her nose runs, her eyes 
water, and her face swells.232 Or worse yet, that co-worker has a safety-
sensitive position, the execution of which is now endangered by cannabis 
inhalation. Although Brandon is a registered medical cannabis patient, his 
 
       226. Nora D. Volkow, Letter from the Director, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Apr. 2020), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/letter-director 
[https://perma.cc/8U5W-WG8K]. 
 227. See generally Francesca Liquori, The Effects of Marijuana Legalization on Employment 
Law, 1 NAGTRI J. 2, 4, 12 (2016). 
 228. Id. Employers may soon rely on ‘safety-sensitive’ exceptions to medical marijuana use. 
Bru, supra note 225.  
 229. Liquori, supra note 227, at 12.  
230. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey, 791 P.2d 688, 693 (Colo. 1990) (citing In re 
Certified Question, 432 Mich. 438, 441 (Mich. 1989)).  
 231. Id. at 696.  
         232. Marijuana Cannabis Allergy, AM. ACAD. ALLERGY ASTHMA & IMMUNOLOGY, https:// 
www.aaaai.org/conditions-and-treatments/library/allergy-library/marijuana-cannabis-allergy [https:// 
perma.cc/W5XJ-CLAC].  
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use of cannabis during work hours has inadvertently caused adverse 
effects. This situation is a prime example as to why the employee use of 
medical cannabis during work hours exception is needed.  
If the employer knows that an employee is using marijuana during 
working hours, or that an employee is impaired during working hours, the 
employer could potentially be sued for negligence or even wrongful death 
if its employee injures or kills a person while performing descriptive job 
duties. An employee’s use of marijuana during working hours could affect 
other employees, as shown in the above example. If one employee uses 
cannabis during work hours, that employee may expose others to the 
substance or even share the cannabis with others, exasperating the 
employer’s potential liability. Furthermore, some employees may not wish 
to be around cannabis (just as many do not wish to be around cigarette 
smoke) and may take issue with another employee using cannabis while at 
work. An employer needs to foster a good work environment not only for 
increasing job productivity but also for fostering employee morale and 
worker satisfaction for all employees. Allowing marijuana during work 
hours could have an adverse impact on that objective.  
Employers should be careful to use this exception only when they 
have a good-faith belief that the employee is using the medical cannabis 
while on duty or on site. Distinguishing the cause and timing of an 
employee’s impairment is a difficult task.233 Traces of cannabis “can 
persist in a person’s body for as long as 30 days after it was last used.” 234 
This causes difficulties in determining whether the employee is impaired 
from using cannabis during the work hours that day, at home the night 
before, or at home ten days before that shift.235 If an employer uses this 
exception, and acts adversely against an employee who tests positive for 
cannabis, that employer may be subject to liability because proving the 
time of impairment is challenging.236  
 
 233. Kline, supra note 217.  
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.; see also Dale L. Deitchler & Wendy M. Krincek, Weed and Work: Are Marijuana Users 
the Newest Protected Class?, NEV. LAW., Feb. 2018, at 10, 13 (“[T]here is no universally accepted 
method of proving whether, or to what extent, an individual is impaired by marijuana, because there 
is no consensus as to what THC concentrate correlates to impairment. Drug tests do not measure 
impairment. Therefore, taking adverse action against an employee creates a risk of violating laws. 
Meanwhile, not taking action and allowing an employee that could be impaired to continue to work, 
particularly in safety-sensitive positions, creates risk of its own.”).  
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Before taking adverse actions against employees under the employee 
use of medical cannabis during work hours exception, employers should 
review their policies, make sure those policies are current with valid law, 
provide the needed notice to all employees, and consult with legal 
counsel.237 
C. Call to Colorado to Protect Its Workers 
Colorado has been a leader in cannabis legalization. Medical 
cannabis is part of its political landscape. It is time that Colorado 
provides protection for employees that are lawfully using a drug that 
has been state-legalized since 2011. The proposed language to 
amend the Colorado Constitution will protect employers from 
litigation, protect employees from discrimination, balance 
competing interests of employers and employees, stop those with 
debilitating conditions from having to choose between a life of pain 
and employment, and increase employment options for both 
employers and employees. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s first author, a member of Gen X, grew up in the 1970s 
and 1980s—a time when cannabis was considered—rightly or wrong—a 
gateway drug that invariably led to increased use of more dangerous drugs 
such as cocaine, heroin, methamphetamines (speed) and methaqualone 
(Quaaludes). By the time this Article’s second author (a Millennial) was 
born, cannabis was much more accepted as a medicinal rather than illicit 
substance. It is those experiences that have framed our discussion. 
Work law in the United States has trended toward increased 
employee protection during the latter half of the twentieth and the early 
twenty-first centuries. These increased protections are particularly true for 
individuals with disabling conditions who, with some accommodation, can 
lead productive lives. Liberalizing laws to permit workers to use medical 
cannabis fits this trend. 
To be sure, work laws are typically a balancing act among various 
interests—especially those of the employer, the worker, co-workers, and 
the public. But protecting the jobs of chronically ill workers to use medical 
cannabis under a doctor’s supervision, coupled with the exceptions 
outlined in this article, meet the concerns of all interested parties. 
 
 237. Kline, supra note 218.  
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Resistance to these laws can be explained primarily by reference to 
early twentieth-century cannabis demonization. That reputation has lasted 
for over a century now. But renewed interest in developing cannabis’s 
medicinal uses has created a cognitive dissidence—a tension between the 
belief that cannabis is a dangerous, gateway drug and the ever-increasing 
scientific proof that cannabis can serve useful medicinal purposes that can 
transform a person’s life from one of disability to one of social 
productivity and personal fulfillment. This is not to say that cannabis does 
not have side-effects. The use of most medical substances can have 
undesirable outcomes or unintended consequences. It is for this reason that 
we recommend certain exceptions to these job-security regulations. 
Accordingly, re-evaluation of decisionmakers’ historical assessment of 
cannabis is prudent in light of evidence that decisionmakers may have had 
political agendas and where medical science has evolved. 
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